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To his pupil Nero and to Lucilius (friend and, as metonymy, representative of the entire 
mankind), Seneca testifies to his pedagogic vocation. With conviction he applies himself to 
demonstrate the perfect correspondence between the Stoic doctrine and the educational strategy 
that he proposes. Firstly, the reciprocity of the relationship between educator and pupil appears 
fundamental; both further their individual knowledge. Secondly, the limitations of an ethical 
precept that is not anchored in the intensity and concreteness of human life becomes clearly 
apparent. Furthermore, it brings to question the weakness of a world vision not inspired by an 
innovative and original path. The starting point is therefore a rigorous examination of 
conscience to ultimately reach the revolutionary experience of risk in the moment of the last 
decision. In the name of truth the wise man must have the courage to embrace fate in order to 
really understand who he is (in a process of oikeiosis both as experience and as target), and he 
must instil in his pupils the courage to take risks along their own independent journey. In so 
doing, self-scrutiny and politics can become intertwined. It is herein that the educator’s risk and 
responsibilities lie. 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks to the intercession of Agrippina, the new wife of the emperor Claudius1, 
Seneca had the opportunity to return from Corsican exile. 
To Seneca, Agrippina committed the education of his son, the young Nero, so he 
could learn the overall basis of eloquence, which was considered a necessary art in 
order to manage power. This opened to the philosopher a double opportunity: first to 
test directly the value of the pedagogic proposal developed according to the Stoic 
doctrine, and secondly, to implement the precept according to which the political 
 
1 Agrippina (the Younger) was the sister of Caligula and of Julia Livilla. The latter, daughter of 
Germanicus and wife of proconsul M. Vinicius, incurred in Messalina’s jealousy, the uncle’s 
first wife, the emperor Claudius. Accused of adultery she was exiled and eventually sentenced 
to death (cf. C. Dio 59, 22; 60, 8, 4-5; 60, 31; Sen., Apocol. 10, 4; Svet., Claud. 29). Seneca 
found himself involved in the matter, it is not clear if as lover or as accomplice of Julia Livilla; 
for this reason he was sentenced to exile, in Corsica, from which he returned in 49. Cf. Griffin 
(1976), pp. 59-60; Abel (1985), p. 670. 
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commitment is peculiar to wise men. In the first half of the Vth century AD Joannes 
Stobaeus, one of the main sources for the reconstruction of Ancient Stoicism, 
summarizes:  
to; politeuvesqai to;n sovfon kai; mavlist j ejn tai`~ toiauvtai~ politeivai~ 
tai`~ ejmfainouvsai~ tina; prokoph;n pro;~ ta;~ teleiva~ politeiva~: kai; to; 
nomoqetei`n de; kai; to; paideuvein ajnqrwvpou~. 
«The sage must go into politics, especially in those States that demonstrate to 
progress toward perfect government forms: he must also legislate and educate 
men». (Stob. 2.7, 11b, 10=14 = SVF 3. 611) 
 
In full maturity Seneca finds himself undertaking a great task; the transfer of the 
most general theoretical assumptions of Stoicism. This inherently involved verification 
of the presumption that the ethic-social theory of Stoicism was not a pure logical 
elaboration, but implied a coherent development in the theory of political action (to; 
politeuvesqai and to; nomoqetei`n) and of didactic/pedagogic action (to; paideuvein). 
It is not clear that what Stobaeus summarizes above matches the results achieved 
in the Ancient Stoa. However, it is clear that in Rome with Seneca we find exemplar 
affirmation. The Ancient Stoa, in fact, mostly concentrated on the study of human 
nature and questioned whether man’s rationality can exist in harmony with the 
rationality of the universe2. This research resulted in the creation of fundamental 
elements such as the oJrmhv (the impulse, the appetition), the pavqo~ (the passion), the 
lovgo~ (the reason), the oijkeivwsi~ (the attraction, the propensity), the sugkatavqesi~ 
(the assent), the oJmologiva (the conformity with nature). From this point on, in the 
Middle Stoa and, in particular, with Panaetius, the urgency of a practical doctrine rose. 
The focus of third doctrine was the concept of kaqhk`on (duty). Later, Cicero3 adapts 
this (and in particular the problem of ‘duty’) to the roman context, favouring a 
functional interpretation of social ethics and, at the end, of politics tout court.  
 
2 To the pages dedicated to human psychology by Pohlenz (1992), I, pp. 111-58, it is necessary 
to add at least the analysis of  Inwood (1985), pp. 18-101, and Long (1996), 134-55. 
3 In reality we owe to Cicero the focus of what the Ancient and the Middle Stoa had elaborated 
in relation to the doctrine of duty. In the De officiis in particular, Cicero certainly declines his 
inquiry in direction of a social application: cf. De off. 1, 9. On this see Inwood (2005), pp. 114-
19. On Panaetius and on his presumed reinterpretation of the theory of action cf. now Alesse 
(1994), pp. 74-83.  
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With Seneca it is ultimately necessary to highlight a new aspect: for the philoso-
pher/preceptor it is not only a matter of testing the doctrine of power in a ‘passive’ 
dimension, that for which the wise man is the one who knows how to resist to suffering 
and remain «constant» in the face of adversities, accepting with steady heart whatever 
fate reserves for him; it is also necessary, to measure the efficacy of the doctrine in the 
‘constructive’ phase. This phase occurs in the moments in which the strategies 
employed and the decisions reached are based in sapiens «agreement» with fate: in 
other words he recognises the line of his development and sets himself to willingly 
bring it about. 
It is an issue of no small importance. In fact it is about educating oneself and 
progressively refining one’s own interior tension in order to overlap the subject’s will 
with the line of tension of all. Thus, in small stages, all the desires that feed the 
individual tension will no longer be irrational, but are brought back to their natural 
function, in harmony with the balance of Nature. And because (for his nature) man is 
not himself evil, there should be no particular problems in his education and guidance 
along the correct course. So when it is read:  
Neminem mihi dabis qui sciat quomodo quod vult coeperit velle: non consilio 
adductus illo sed impetu inpactus est (Ep. 37, 5), 
 
it must be understood that at the origin there is an instinctive tension but after, on that it 
is grafted deliberation, there exists conscious will of deciding this or that, of realizing a 
certain desire or of banning another.  
From this, therefore, the importance of an education that is capable of recovering 
rationally what a man, at first, non-rationally feels in himself. We must take note of this 
important notation; and since, as it has already been observed, man belongs to the 
development of the perfectly balanced natural totality, it happens that the interior 
impulse (impetus) will only originally be positive. In fact, for this reason (that is for this 
good original nature) man can find within himself the key to defend from evil and to 
consciously and absolutely want good:  
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Quidque facere te potest bonum tecum est. Quid tibi opus est ut sis bonus? Velle. 
(Ep. 80, 3-4). 
 
That is: Will becomes the method with which rational control is translated into 
the a-rational forms of desire, the tool that allows to every single human being to 
become really «wise», which the truth of everything shows itself through, the truth of 
Fate that deterministically and unavoidably states itself4.  
 
Among the teachers that Seneca had in his youth, three are always remembered 
with high respect and admiration: Sotion of Alexandria (belonging to the School of 
Sextii), Attalus (Stoic) and Papirius Fabianus (also linked to the school of Sextii)5. It is 
very probable that they have influenced the precise direction of a positive view and 
‘active’ Stoicism. On one hand the Pythagoric tradition from which the School of Sextii 
took inspiration makes central the moment of formation: a real training of the person 
toward the control of his body and his mind in relation to Nature and the surrounding 
reality. Starting with this exercise, a severe attention toward one’s life condition should 
be developed and, so, a thoughtful attitude towards human relations. 
On the other hand: the real Stoic course, according to which the structure of 
natural reality, organised on the basis of a logical and physical necessity, in itself should 
have put man in the right place and in the right disposition to allow him to express his 
own virtue. 
This entails a progressive knowledge of oneself as well as of Nature and its 
rules.  
Seneca, in a passage of De ira, shows the importance of the exercise of «reason» 
in self-control and how decisive the teaching of the School of Sextii6 was. Senses can be 
 
4 For a more analytic discussion about these points I refer to Inwood (2005a), pp. 132-41, and to 
Maso (2006), pp. 15-21 and 26-39. 
5 Cf. Griffin (1976), pp. 36-43; Abel (1985), pp. 661-64. About the school of Sextii cf. Lana 
(1973), pp. 339-89; in particular, on the aspect as ‘active’ manner of speaking that allows the 
realization of a «very high ideal», pp. 341-42.  
6 In Nat. q. 7, 32, 2, Seneca quotes the School of Quintus Sestius and of his son Sestius Niger (I 
c. BC.) reminding its importance and the originality within the roman tradition and feeling sorry 
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stabilised if the mind is balanced; but the mind will be such a condition and will not 
anger if it knows that after, it will have to report daily to reason: 
Omnes sensus perducendi sunt ad firmitatem; natura patientes sunt, si animus 
illos desît corrumpere, qui cotidie ad rationem reddendam uocandus est. 
Faciebat hoc Sextius, ut consummato die, cum se ad nocturnam quietem 
recepisset, interrogaret animum suum: 'quod hodie malum tuum sanasti? Cui 
uitio obstitisti? Qua parte melior es?'  Desinet ira et moderatior erit quae sciet 
sibi cotidie ad iudicem esse ueniendum. (De ira 3, 36, 1-2) 
 
Through the frequentation of Sotion and of Papirius Fabianus7, Seneca learned 
and adopted such a precept. He demonstrates its scrupulous application describing the 
intimacy of a family scene in which he usually acts: it is already evening, the last lamp 
has been taken from the room and his wife is finally quiet, conscious of the fact that her 
husband, engrossed in darkness and silence, starts his own examination of conscience. 
He intends to judge himself going through his own errors; rather than to focus the best 
or most correct strategy of practice in human relations:  
Quicquam ergo pulchrius hac consuetudine excutiendi totum diem? Qualis ille 
somnus post recognitionem sui sequitur, quam tranquillus, quam altus ac liber, 
cum aut laudatus est animus aut admonitus et speculator sui censorque secretus 
cognouit de moribus suis! Vtor hac potestate et cotidie apud me causam dico. 
Cum sublatum e conspectu lumen est et conticuit uxor moris iam mei conscia, 
totum diem meum scrutor factaque ac dicta mea remetior; nihil mihi ipse 
abscondo, nihil transeo. Quare enim quicquam ex erroribus meis timeam, cum 
possim dicere: 'uide ne istud amplius facias, nunc tibi ignosco. In illa 
disputatione pugnacius locutus es: noli postea congredi cum imperitis; nolunt 
discere qui numquam didicerunt. Illum liberius admonuisti quam debebas, 
itaque  non emendasti sed offendisti: de cetero uide, non tantum an uerum sit 
 
for its premature closing: Sextiorum nova et Romani roboris secta inter initia sua, cum magno 
impetu coepisset, extincta est.  
7 According to Seneca’s texts Sotion turns out to have being a trusty interpreter of the teachings 
of the School of Sextii, attentive in particular to the control of one’s own body, to diet, in order 
to guarantee a correct relation among all the living beings, independently from the soul survival 
after death; cf. ep. 108, 18-21. Papirius Fabianus instead transmitted to Seneca most of all the 
admiration for the Ancients and for the practical consistency of his Ethics proposal, (ep. 100, 1-
12), both in educational field (mores ille, non verba composuit et animis scripsit ista, non 
auribus) and in politic field (Fabiani Papiri libros qui inscribuntur civilium legisse te 
cupidissime scribis). 
 
6 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. V 2011 Issue 1 
 
 
 
 
quod dicis, sed an ille cui dicitur ueri patiens sit: admoneri bonus gaudet, 
pessimus quisque rectorem asperrime patitur. (De ira 3, 36, 2-4)     
 
Only when the consciousness of being is in balance with the natural unfolding of 
world events (to which he belongs) can man be quiet and free. There are no debts; the 
language of law (ad rationem reddendam vocare, interrogare, ad iudicem venire, 
excutere, recognitio, speculator, censor, cognoscere, potestas, causam dicere, scrutare, 
remetiri, error, ignoscere, emendare, offendere) confirms the register that Seneca has 
adopted and the line along which he is moving. In the internal conversation with himself 
- a conversation that must occur daily because it is strictly linked to a training practiced 
tenaciously - Seneca structures his own personality and defines a method to educate 
himself. Praise and admonishment are part of the strategy. So, as with the self-precept 
technique, the real aim is seen only in the background and must be taken back to the 
perfect virtus from which the sapiens tends for his nature. 
Seneca, in other words, is the living witness of a real and true paradox: he «is» 
wise (because he has consciously made virtus his reason of being) and, at the same time, 
«he must continue to be» wise. If the condition of Stoic sapiens is not, in roman contest, 
once and for all achieved, but it is such if and only if it is continuously witnessed in 
action; a self-check on internal action and, as necessary consequence, a willing to open 
toward the exterior. Seneca in fact will continue the day after day (and so every 
‘tomorrow’ of his life) to discuss, to educate, to write, to propose the Stoic doctrine as a 
life strategy. He will transpose his internal experience from its initial form to wisdom. 
In this prospective he clearly shows himself as an original interpreter of the stoic 
doctrine of Ethics, perhaps a predecessor of that philosophic-practical ‘active’ thought 
that will find in Epictetus one of its main8 characters. 
 
Certainly in the educational strategy the reciprocal availability and willingness 
of both teacher and pupil is necessary. This means the recognition of the other and of 
 
8 Long (1971), pp. 173-99, misses the centrality of Seneca’s position: the scholar, pp. 189-92, 
finds in Epictetus the first and the main interpreter of this new moral attitude. 
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the distinct roles that each individual unfolds. Seneca remembers with precision the 
walks himself and his teacher Attalus took, and the consequent discussions that allowed 
both to improve and progress along the path of wisdom. Enjoying time with a 
philosopher always brings some benefit, just as, under the sun, one tans even if he did 
not want to; or as when one, that stops a little in a perfumery, exits followed by scent:  
Haec nobis praecipere Attalum memini, cum scholam eius obsideremus et primi 
veniremus et novissimi exiremus, ambulantem quoque illum ad aliquas 
disputationes evocaremus, non tantum paratum discentibus sed obvium. 'Idem' 
inquit 'et docenti et discenti debet esse propositum, ut ille prodesse velit, hic 
proficere.' Qui ad philosophum venit cotidie aliquid secum boni ferat: aut sanior 
domum redeat aut sanabilior. Redibit autem: ea philosophiae vis est ut non 
studentis sed etiam conversantis iuvet. Qui in solem venit, licet non in hoc 
venerit, colorabitur; qui in unguentaria taberna resederunt et paullo diutius 
commorati sunt odorem secum loci ferunt; et qui ad philosophum fuerunt 
traxerint aliquid necesse est quod prodesset etiam neglegentibus. Attende quid 
dicam: neglegentibus, non repugnantibus. (Ep. 108, 3-4) 
 
Did Seneca expect this from Nero? Did he expect to speak with a pupil not 
hostile to the values of philosophy? Did he expect to experience such a constructive 
relationship for himself?  
Does he expect this from Lucilius? 
 
In effect both Nero and Lucilius are the most important recipients of the project 
and of the pedagogic action of Seneca. A cultured man, Seneca applies himself both 
toward his direct pupil and toward humanity at large, personified by his younger friend 
Lucilius. He imagines being able to admonish and correct the nature of the future 
emperor through a call to philosophy and also through the exercise of rhetoric and 
literary art. This broadens the horizon to humanity in its global aspect, he proposes to 
himself to add to the education, wisdom and virtue of any man that ‘does not oppose or 
put up resistance’ (non repugnans) to philosophy.  
In Nero’s case Seneca will operate in very delicate conditions. The pupil, when 
young, will still be perceptive to his calls, the application of an elementary teaching by 
precepts will appear sufficient. This is the same type of teaching by precepts that 
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initially Isocrates had used to teach the moves of fight to his disciple, but that his pupil, 
a little at time, had started to apply by himself9. Following this, in the moment of the 
succession to throne, the necessity to give solid support to an emperor that has the 
responsibility to act and decide for the good of his people becomes pertinent. At this 
level teaching by precepts is no longer enough, it necessitates that the practice of 
philosophical theories acquired and assumed the rule of behaviour. It would be 
necessary to pass from the kaqhvkonta to the katorqwvmata, the operative indications 
concerning the direct knowledge of the correct path. But with the young Nero any effort 
seems useless, it is not enough to warn him from the negative outcome of anger10 or to 
suggest to him the use of clemency11. Neither is the ingenious strategy of proposing to 
Nero a gloomy representation of reality successful. This reality corresponds to a 
representation born in the tragedies; many scholars believe in fact that Seneca decided 
to compose them with a specific moral and pedagogic intent, to display evil in its most 
dramatic forms in order to avoid its practice. To the exhibition of the human being 
‘destruction’ should be able to oppose the ‘affirmation’ of the positive hero. It is instead 
 
9 Seneca does not seem to know Isocrates: perhaps he evokes it in tranq. a. 7.2, if we accept the 
correction ad loc. of Erasmus; in that passage Seneca is underlining how important is that the 
teacher fully understands the real aptitudes of the pupil: considerandum est, utrum natura tua 
agendis rebus an otioso studio contemplationique aptior sit, et eo inclinandum, quo te vis 
ingenii feret. In any case it is important to understand how the greek paideia could be 
influenced inside the Stoic educational project in the roman contest; so promised Isoc., ad 
Demon. 12: «As bodies for the law of nature grow with proper efforts (toi`~ summevtroi~ 
povnoi~), so the soul with wise precepts (toi~` spoudaivoi~ lovgoi~). Therefore I will try to 
briefly suggest you through which practices (di j w|n … ejpithdeumavtwn) you can do huge 
progress along the way of virtue and enjoy good fame among all other men». 
10 The dialogue De ira very probably had already been composed when Seneca had the charge 
of preceptor of Nero. It so could be dated back to 41 AD, after the death of the emperor Tiberius 
and before the exile. In any case the name of the recipient, the brother Novatus, indicates that at 
the time he had not received yet the new patronymic following the adoption (52 AD) by his 
teacher of rhetoric Junius Gallio. Cf. Giancotti (1957), pp. 98-102; Griffin (1976), pp. 396-98; 
Abel (1985), p. 705.  
11 The De clementia (written between December of 55 and December of 56) is directly 
dedicated to Nero. Cf. in particular Griffin (1976), pp. 407-11, Malaspina (2005), pp. 6-8, and 
Braund (2009), pp. 16-23. Regarding the underlying moral for which the politic clemency and 
the clemency of judge must transform in an authentic prodesse toward subjects and toward man 
in general, cf. Bellincioni (1984).   
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the Stoic sapiens the one to imitate12. So, along with the ‘exemplar precepts’ offered to 
Nero in the De clementia, to which it is necessary to set aside the psychological 
stimulus represented by the positive hero to imitate, comes together as antithesis the 
‘obsessive’ description of evil that can derive from a bad use of power13. On one hand 
the ‘good prince’, on the other the ‘tyrant’. 
As we know, Seneca is absolutely conscious of the difficulties of his task; he 
knows the court environment and the innate problems of translating into practice the 
moral teachings of Stoicism. He helps Nero in any way possible to realize a civil project 
useful to the People14, and facilitates independence from his mother Agrippina. 
However, in the end, the operation fails and the amicus principis has to abandon his role 
as a tutor, as a teacher and then as counsellor15. 
 
 
The situation for Lucilius is completely different. After renouncing the role of 
educator and counsellor of the prince, Seneca rediscovers his deepest inspiration, 
reopening the games addressing humanity through Lucilius. This must be interpreted 
from Epistulae; but the same thing must be done regarding the seven books De 
 
12 Abel writes (1985), pp. 767-68: «Die tragischen Themas Senecas zerfallen in zwei Gruppen; 
die moralische Selbstbehauptung ist der Vorwurf des ‘Hercules furens’, ‘Oedipus’ und der 
‘Troades’; die moralische Selbstzerstörung ist Leitthema in der ‘Medea’, dem ‘Agamemnon’ 
und ‘Thyest’. Die ‘Phaedra’ nimmt eine Zwischenstellung ein, indem sie die Heldin zum 
großgeschauten Sinnbild der Vernichtung und Wiederaufrichtung der sittlichen Würde macht». 
Dingel (1974), pp. 72-120, defines the world represented in Seneca’s tragedy  as the place of the 
authentic Negation der Philosophie. Fitch & McElduff (2008), pp. 157-80, return on the 
‘constructive’ and training elements of tragedy. 
13 Viansino (2007), I, in partic. pp. 6-10, insists very effectively on the educational-politic 
function of tragedy.  
14 For the influence and the success of Seneca and of Afranius Burrus as ministers during the so-
called quinquennium Neronis, (54-58) I remand to the discussion about the witnesses of Tacitus 
and of Cassio Dio present in Griffin (1976), pp. 67-128. More generally, cf. Scullard (1970), pp. 
315-18.  
15 The failure becomes complete with the suicide which Seneca is obliged to. Tacitus comments, 
Ann. 15, 62-64: Cui enim ignaram fuisse saevitiam Neronis? Neque aliud superasse post 
matrem fratremque interfectos, quam ut educatoris praeceptorisque necem adiceret. 
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beneficiis dedicated to the friend Aebutius Liberalis and with the majority of Dialogi16. 
Seneca in an epistle of the first book of the collection addressed to Lucilius declares to 
retire to a more private life in order to devote himself to posterity (posterorum negotium 
ago). He says to have verified himself carefully through the efficacy of medicines (in 
meis ulceribus expertus) and claims to now be able to indicate, in old age, the correct 
way to follow (rectum iter ... aliis monstro): 
In hoc me recondidi et fores clusi, ut prodesse pluribus possem ... Secessi non 
tantum ab hominibus sed a rebus, et inprimis a meis rebus: posterorum 
negotium ago. Illis aliqua quae possint prodesse conscribo; salutares 
admonitiones, velut medicamentorum utilium compositiones, litteris mando, esse 
illas efficaces in meis ulceribus expertus, quae etiam si persanata non sunt, 
serpere desierunt. Rectum iter, quod sero cognovi et lassus errando, aliis 
monstro. (Ep. 8, 1-3) 
 
His own experience is fundamental; to Seneca it is no longer a matter of 
transposing immediately, that is a direct application of the ethic-social theory of 
Stoicism; instead he believes that the right moment has arrived for a great leap and 
imagines himself as counsellor and teacher for future generations17.  
Two letters specifically refer to this. The 94 and the 95 both have a particular 
function; primarily they are very large, totalling 147 paragraphs when combined. With 
the short letter 93 (only 12 paragraphs) acting as an introduction, they compose the 
 
16 The treatise De beneficiis according to the internal clues and to series of indications derivable 
most of all from the Epistulae, has to be set in the period that follows Seneca’s retirement from 
power; mostly in 62/63. Cf. Préchac (1972), pp. I-XXVII. Griffin agrees (1976), p. 399. The 
topic faced and the moral proposal connected, cfr. Abel (1985), pp. 734-38, and, overall, 
Chaumartin (1985), pp. 157-94: the scholar analyzes the relation preceptor/pupil underlining the 
critical points in the relation between Seneca and Nero. It is interesting to note that the treatise 
includes in itself aspects and argumentation that concern both to the concrete moral problems of 
individual and more generally to the social-politic environment, and that in respect of Seneca 
committing  himself to interpret the Stoic theory. On this Inwood (2005b), pp. 65-94. Referring 
to  Dialogi, even for them it is necessary to imagine an universal ‘recipient’ beyond the specific 
friends or relatives which they are occasionally dedicated to: Lucilius, Serenus, Novatus (= 
Gallio), Marcia, Paulinus, Polybius, Helvia. 
17 Seneca specifies that the task to give advice does not only concern to pedagogue, as thought 
by the Stoic Aristo of Chios, but all the more to philosopher, that is to wise man: who is he if 
not the pedagogue of human being? Nam eum locum qui monitiones continet sustulit et 
paedagogi esse dixit (Ariston Chius), non philosophi, tamquam quidquam aliud sit sapiens 
quam generis humani paedagogus, ep. 89, 13. 
 
11 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. V 2011 Issue 1 
 
 
 
 
book XV of the letters. The letter 93 poses a question; what is the right duration in order 
to define a well-accomplished life? Seneca stresses that everyone inhabits the time they 
are supposed to (§ 6 habeo meum); what is necessary and useful is only the time that is 
required to reach wisdom (§ 8: Quaeris quod sit amplissimum vitae spatium? usque ad 
sapientiam vivere).  
But the real point is this: how can one obtain wisdom in the time that is granted 
to us? Here we find a real treatise of pedagogy, at the core of which is a technical issue 
of strategical importance: should the education to wisdom be established on decreta or 
on praecepta? What is the correct use of the former and which is the most effective of 
the latter? Is there an interaction between the two? 
Utrum utilis an inutilis sit (scil. scientia praeceptorum), et an solus virum bonum 
possit efficere, id est utrum supervacuus sit an omnis faciat supervacuos. (Ep.  
94, 4) 
 
It is clear that the decreta, that Seneca also indicates as scita or placita (ep. 95, 
10), correspond to the dovgmata of all theoretical sciences; just like astronomy or 
geometry, also the ars contemplativa (that is the theoretical study of philosophy) has its 
own principles. They aim to indicate that the general principles18 applied to action are 
no doubt recta et honesta (ep. 94, 32). In reference to this, the action of the wise man 
can only answer to the authentic ojrqo;~ lovgo~, the correct reason, so it a katovrqwma is 
necessary as an action directed to rectitude. 
Therefore it is possible to perceive, between the folds of this argumentation, a 
logical development, on the basis of which we can find the indissoluble relation 
between wisdom and correct action. This is the conclusion that, according to Seneca, 
belongs to the Stoic Aristo of Chios. For whom: 
 
18 Seneca sustains that decreta philosophiae are practically a sort of generalia praecepta (ep. 94, 
31). These ones are opposite to specialia praecepta. Both «teach»: utraque res praecipit, sed 
altera in totum, particulatim altera. It seems to be a convergence, if not an underlying identity, 
for which ones without the others cannot be efficient, cf. Bellincioni (1978), pp. 87-116; 
Ioppolo (2000), pp. 15-18; Schafer (2009), pp. 105-09. 
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Plurimum ait proficere ipsa decreta philosophiae constitutionemque summi 
boni; 'quam qui bene intellexit ac didicit quid in quaque re faciendum sit sibi 
ipse praecipit'. (Ep. 94, 2) 
 
These words are followed by the eloquent example of a javelin; whoever has to 
throw it, trains himself in moving the arm and aiming towards a series of targets. When 
the trainee is confident, he will be able to hit not only the series of targets that were used 
during the training, but any target (quocumque vult), without having to be taught the 
particulars (non desiderat particulatim admoneri, doctus in totum, ep. 94, 3). 
At first, the position of Aristo appears defendable. However, for Seneca this is 
not the case. On one hand, between theory and praxis there is a very clear discrepancy19; 
on the other, the wise man was not born wise, but he has had to become so 
progressively. According to this it is necessary that decreta and praecepta appear and 
work in unison. Thus it is possible to know one’s task, one’s duty, as to correct action 
(katovrqwma). But this is not immediately followed by the specification: 
Hic quoque doctus quidem est facere quae debet, sed haec non satis perspicit. 
(Ep. 94, 32) 
 
We must also consider other factors linked to the environmental and social-
historical context in which one lives, and importantly, the different stages along the path 
toward wisdom that everyone walks. Seneca openly speaks about proficiens to indicate 
those who are walking toward wisdom; it is a path that can be so long that could last a 
lifetime and that can even develop, step by step, in a congenial way according to the 
different stages of life, from childhood through to old age20. The proficiens is someone 
who is learning how to live for his entire life: tamdiu discendum est quemadmodum 
 
19 Sen., ep. 94, 48: 'Philosophia' inquit 'dividitur in haec, scientiam et habitum animi; nam qui 
didicit et facienda ac vitanda percepit nondum sapiens est nisi in ea quae didicit animus eius 
transfiguratus est. 
20 Ep. 121, 15: Quomodo ergo infans conciliari constitutioni rationali potest, cum rationalis 
nondum sit?' Unicuique aetati sua constitutio est, alia infanti, alia puero, <alia adulescenti>, 
alia  seni: omnes ei constitutioni conciliantur in qua sunt. Consequently, to be proficientes 
means always to be on the way, «sempre in cammino, e in una tensione continua delle forze la 
quale consenta di procedere anziché di regredire», Bellincioni (1978), p. 81. 
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vivas quamdiu vivas, (ep. 76, 3). Thus the elder will also have something to learn: etiam 
seni esse discendum (ibid.). 
It is clear that if someone is a proficiens, they are one that has not received yet a 
complete training. Therefore he cannot own all the requirements of knowledge, in a 
simply deductive way: 
quando oporteat et in quantum et cum quo et quemadmodum et quare. (Ep.  95, 
5) 
 
It is those more specific praecepta that he needs, those that only the wise 
preceptor (or the teacher or the counsellor) will be able to propose him. Unlike the 
thinking of Aristo, decreta is not sufficient; on the other hand neither praecepta alone is 
sufficient. That is, those warnings which indicate, circumstance by circumstance, what 
an individual is meant to do: the officium, the kaqhk`on21. Specialia praecepta (ep. 94, 
31). These are themselves endless, since the different circumstances in which they occur 
are endless. Consequently, if someone thought of having to always decide only on the 
basis of detailed and personalized instructions, he would risk being unable to act or to 
proceed on his own. Seneca is explicit regarding this, he does not hesitate to suggest 
that to allow every proficiens to catch sight of his own path the purpose of an 
educational project. Certainly the teacher will be sensitive to character differences, for 
in some cases he intervenes with the necessary iudicium: hoc vitabis, hoc facies (ep. 94, 
50). In particular the weaker characters will tend to hesitate to take the initiative on their 
own. They lack confidence to the point that they risk losing sight of the real good: 
wisdom. It is right, in these cases, to intervene:  
Inbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necessarium est aliquem praeire: 'hoc vitabis, 
hoc facies'. Praeterea si expectat tempus quo per se sciat quid optimum factu sit, 
interim errabit et errando inpedietur quominus ad illud perveniat quo possit se 
esse contentus: regi ergo debet dum incipit posse se regere. (Ep. 94, 50-51) 
 
21 As it is known, the roman pedagogic literature recovered from the philosophy of Panaetius of 
Rhodes the topic of «duty»: not only the De officiis of Cicero is constructed referring to the 
peri; tou` kaqhvkonto~, but also M. Iunius Brutus (as Seneca reminds) had elaborated a rich 
education based on precepts addressed to parents, to children and brothers: M. Brutus in eo libro 
quem peri; kaqhvkonto~ inscripsit dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus, ep. 
95, 45. 
 
14 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. V 2011 Issue 1 
 
 
 
 
 
But it is evident that, everything aside, the way of wisdom is available to all. 
This is because it is not Nature that sets us on the path to vice; Nature generated us pure 
and free: Nulli nos vitio natura conciliat: illa integros ac liberos genuit (Ep. 94, 56). 
Proficiens must therefore be thought of as receiving the correct precepts, and as 
being able to insert them in an educational project perfectly complying with Nature. 
Such proficiens will eventually gain his own independence and, in turn, will be able to 
explore new ways of teaching to others how best to become virtuous.  
In another important letter, the 33, Seneca focuses on the following passage, 
directly facing his friend Lucilius and inviting him to take charge of his own 
responsibilities, to take charge of the possibility of exhibiting his own virtue: 
Quousque disces? iam et praecipe. (...) Adice nunc quod isti qui numquam 
tutelae suae fiunt primum in ea re sequuntur priores in qua nemo non a priore 
descivit; deinde in ea re sequuntur quae adhuc quaeritur. Numquam autem 
invenietur, si contenti fuerimus inventis. Praeterea qui alium sequitur nihil 
invenit, immo nec quaerit. (Ep. 33, 9-10) 
 
The key question appears immediately after: Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum 
vestigia? 
The answer is extremely important. It indicates on one hand that every path of 
research can be improved and perfected; and on the other hand highlights the space left 
for research to become available to everyone. Individuals must equally pursue the 
truth22 for their own lives. And even if humanity as a whole has progressed greatly, 
there are still further territories to explore: 
Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si 
propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt 
non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; 
multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (Ep. 33, 11) 
 
Between decreta and praecepta the individual training continues, and in parallel, 
so does the teacher’s job. 
 
22 On the conception of truth in Seneca, let me refer to Maso (2006a), pp. 153-84.  
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Each must take charge of his own task and, most importantly, must take 
responsibility for his own decisions. The real teacher must take his own risks; he must 
know when to loosen or tighten the harness and, in so doing, he must consider the 
pupil’s character. But most of all he must know when it is the right moment to «leave» 
the harness to the pupil. For the pupil then, something similar occurs in parallel; he will 
have to understand when the right moment to independently from his teacher arises. 
Then he will no longer depend on his models, nec ad exempla pendere et totiens 
respicere ad magistrum (ep. 33, 8-9). 
 In the dimension of action we see the triumph of what was proposed by the 
theory of the Stoic doctrine. It can be a private or personal path, or an openly public and 
politic one. Regardless, the risk of «jumping» must be taken, and with it the 
responsibility. 
Seneca, in a beautiful reinterpretation of the myth of Phaëton, alludes to the 
importance of decision making and to the risks associated with; (a) the adolescent 
reaching maturity; (b) the teacher (or the parent) assumption of the responsibility to 
stand aside and (c) the philosophical theory of Stoicism and the deterministic and 
providential structure that sustains him. This structure must be able to provide support 
against unforeseen shortcomings. 
The aforementioned passage belongs to De providentia, a dialogue that has been 
problematic concerning the temporal collocation. However, beyond the doubts that 
persist, the global picture and the argumentations that spur the latest commentator23 to 
propose a late dating (around  64) are convincing. That is, in parallel to the writing of 
Naturales quaestiones and of Epistulae, both dedicated to Lucilius. In my opinion this 
late dating sits comfortably with the meaning of the myth of Phaëton; a call to 
responsibility and to courage that whoever embraces Stoicism must demonstrate. So it 
is not an invitation to bear difficulties, pain and isolation but rather one to take and 
claim all the risks that are implicit in the arduous walk of virtus. As soon as the 
 
23 Cf. Lanzarone (2008), pp. 13-18. Neither Giancotti (1957), pp. 308-09, nor Griffin (1976), pp. 
400-01, are able to solve the issue, for whom the dialogue results not datable. Also Dionigi 
(1994), pp. 5400-04, appears very undecided even if he considers the low dating «undoubtedly 
more credible». 
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proficiens starts making his own decisions, he becomes «willing» and in harmony with 
the fate that anyway is meant for him24. This is a fate that belongs to «Nature» in its 
cosmic dimension, a fate that sees itself resolving any contradictory element; including 
the possible (but necessary) failures. In De prov. 5, 9-11 Seneca rhetorically questions 
the reason for god’s iniquitous allocation of fate among men, highlighting that good 
men often bear major blows of adverse fortune. The fact is that virtue is only virtuous if 
it is tested. Moreover, if it is true that the wise man only appears wise in the moment he 
displays his virtue through action, then the disgraces and misfortunes of life will appear 
decisive in order to be successful. 
At this point, the adventure of Phaëton, the young adolescent, son of the Sun and 
of the Oceanid Clymene, is quoted. Phaëton, with a subterfuge managed to get his 
fathers permission to drive the cart, but eventually ended his race by falling into the 
Eridanus river (the Po). His sisters, the Heliades, met at the river and wept, eventually 
being transformed in poplars25. Seneca’s narration is particularly elaborate. Two 
passages of the text of Metamorphoses of Ovid (2, 63-69 e 79-81) are inserted, as a 
carving, but the tale, taken as a whole, is aimed at a different task. It begins from the 
same situation as the helmsman, who had a difficult job and has to keep the course 
against Fate. As a tenacious man he will have to face hardships: 
Non erit illi planum iter: sursum oportet ac deorsum eat, fluctuetur ac navigium 
in turbido regat. Contra fortunam illi tenendus est cursus; multa accident dura, 
aspera, sed quae molliat et conplanet ipse. Ignis aurum probat, miseria fortes 
viros. (De prov. 5, 9)  
 
Suddenly Seneca uses the second person as the means of narrative, and seems at 
first to refer to a generic interlocutor. However, as will become clear, he is in fact 
identifying himself with Zeus. The «you» is referred to Phaëton; Phaëton will have to 
learn that he will travel through unsafe places: 
 
24 This is the updated resumption of Stoic sugkatavqesi~ (of adsensum) stoica: non pareo deo, 
sed adsentior; ex animo illum, non quia necesse est, sequor (ep. 96, 2). 
25 Cf. Lanzarone (2008), pp. 370-72; I have had the opportunity to examine this passage also in 
respect of the Epicurean prospective: Maso (2007), pp. 269-78. 
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Vide quam alte escendere debeat virtus: scies illi non per secura vadendum. (De 
prov. 5, 10) 
 
Quoting Ovid, Seneca proceeds presenting the risks and difficulties of the 
exploit. To this Phaëton retorts that he is attracted to danger and by the risk of falling: 
Haec cum audisset ille generosus adulescens, ‘placet’ inquit ‘via, escendo; est 
tanti per ista ire casuro’. (De prov. 5, 11) 
 
For the last time his father Zeus intervenes; as the preceptor would do in his 
place. Zeus warns the pupil potential consequences for him. He admonishes him and 
tries to frighten him (territare)26. But the praeceptum is not sufficient and, instead, has 
the opposite effect; in the end the adolescent makes his decision and embraces his fate 
without hesitation. It thus observes a young boldness (his quibus deterreri me putas 
incitor) and a even-handedness (libet illic stare ubi ipse Sol trepidat) within an ethical 
picture, that is noble and perfectly Stoic (per alta uirtus it):  
Post haec ait: 'iunge datos currus: his quibus deterreri me putas incitor; libet 
illic stare ubi ipse Sol trepidat.' Humilis et inertis est tuta sectari: per alta uirtus 
it. (De prov. 5, 11) 
 
It is a man’s task to take charge of his own condition. Learning this craft with a 
perfect cognition of causes under the sign of truth; this was the task of the pupil Nero, 
and perhaps Lucilius, but it definitely belonged to the wise stoic. The decision of 
Phaëton sets this approach in the dimension of the tragic and heroic; now his condition 
is comparable to that of Hercules, the hero that bears his destiny with the prospective of 
reaching the sky and the sky constellations27. That is truly recognising one’s virtue and 
 
26 We are in the imminence of the tragedy. It is important to compare this experience with the 
educational task of the tragedy. See above. 
27 As for Phaëton, for Hercules the way is also difficult: Non est ad astra mollis e terris via 
(Herc. f. 437). It is the journey that fate and Zeus firstly appear to refuse him: Quid astra, 
genitor, quid negas? (Herc. Oet. 13), but which virtue actually aims to: virtus in astra tendit, in 
mortem timor (Herc. Oet. 1971). And it is the same indication that, though methodically 
different, since youth Seneca had borrowed from the School of Sextii: Credamus itaque Sextio 
monstranti pulcherrimum iter et clamanti ‘hac itur ad astra, hac secundum frugalitatem, hac 
secundum temperantiam, hac secundum fortitudinem (ep. 73, 15). 
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celebrating the Stoic ideal. With Phaëton and Hercules, the stoic sapiens aims to verify 
what he has understood to be the inescapable starting condition, that to «endanger» 
himself in the prospective of destiny. And so he matches his proper internal tension 
with the needs of development and realization of humanity. This is the line along which 
Stoic philosophy develops, in the moment that makes itself interpreter of the most 
radical sense of «risk», an operation that is both revolutionary and indispensable to 
existence28. 
This is not a case to put to paideuvein and to politeuvesqai, instead it must be 
intertwined in the ‘active’ interpretation of Roman Seneca, if the original predisposition 
of the human subject is to be recognized in the social dimension: in spite of 
contradictions and compromises, despite the apparent refusals: but because of deeper 
and secret expectations. 
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